

Message Text

SECRET

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40

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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O 211215Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 525

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0221

NODIS

SUGGEST DEPT REPEAT KHARTOUM, ACCRA, MOGADISCIO, LAGOS,
ADDIS ABABA

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, AO, US, OAU, SU, TZ, ET, SO, GH, NI

SUBJECT: CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH CHIEFS OF STATE

REF: (A) STATE 012770, (B) DAR ES SALAAM 0169

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT NYERERE TOLD ME JANUARY 21 THAT HE
"ENCOURAGED" BY US VIEWS ANGOLA SET FORTH REF A. HE REFUSED
COMMIT HIMSELF ON ANY SPECIFICS FOR DEALING WITH COORDINATED
APPROACH TO SOUTH AFRICAN/RUSSIAN/CUBAN WITHDRAWAL, BUT
INDICATED DESIRE CONTINUE DIALOGUE WITH US AND HINTED AT
POSSIBILITY BEING HELPFUL AT LATER DATE. END SUMMARY.

2. UPON HIS RETURN FROM INDIA EARLY THIS MORNING, PRESIDENT
NYERERE ASKED ME TO COME TO HIS HOUSE AT 11:00 A.M. FOR WHAT
TURNED OUT TO BE ONE HOUR DISCUSSION ANGOLA. I WENT OVER
POINTS REF A, DRAWING ALSO ON SECRETARY'S JANUARY 14 PRESS
CONFERENCE (STATE 010223).

3. NYERERE RESPONDED THAT HE ALWAYS HAPPY TALK WITH US ABOUT
"FRIGHTENING" SUBJECT ANGOLA. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY (A) CLEARLY
STATED US OPPOSITION TO SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT AND ITS
WILLINGNESS CONCENTRATE FIRST ON SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL, AND
(B) SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AT PRESS CONFERENCE THAT US PREPARED
AGREE END ALL MILITARY SHIPMENTS AND WILLING NEGOTIATE ABOUT
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"NOMINAL SHIPMENTS FOR NORMAL GOVERNMENT BY AFRICAN STANDARDS".

4. HE THEN SAID HE WANTED TO BEG US TO UNDERSTAND AFRICANS REAL HORROR OF (A) SOUTH AFRICA'S BEING MILITARILY INVOLVED ON CONTINENT BEYOND ITS BORDERS, AND (B) GETTING WESTERN SUPPORT OR TOLERATION FOR SUCH INVOLVEMENT. HE HAD PLAYED LITTLE PUBLIC ROLE AT ADDIS BUT HAD WORKED AS HARD AS HE COULD IN CORRIDORS TO GET AFRICAN AGREEMENT ON TWO POINT APPROACH: "SOUTH AFRICANS GET OUT; ANGOLANS UNITE". IF THIS COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED, PROBLEM WOULD HAVE BEEN SOLVED, SINCE "ANGOLANS UNITE" MEANT GETTING ALL ANGOLAN FACTIONS PARTICIPATING IN NEW GOVERNMENT AND ALSO GETTING RUSSIANS AND CUBANS OUT. HOWEVER, HE HAD FAILED. OAU SUMMIT HAD GONE "CRITICALLY WRONG". HE WAS NOW WORRIED ABOUT WHAT CONTINUED SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BEYOND ITS BORDERS MIGHT MEAN FOR MOZAMBIQUE, ZAMBIA AND OTHER NEIGHBORS. IT WAS IRONIC THAT US SEEMED PREPARED NOW TO RECOGNIZE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN ISSUE WHEN HALF OAU NATIONS HAD NOT.

5. I SAID I WISHED BEG HIM IN TURN TO UNDERSTAND IMPORTANCE OF BROADER FACTORS INVOLVED IN SOVIET AND CUBAN ROLES IN ANGOLA, CITING, INTER ALIA, OUR EXPERIENCES WITH RUSSIANS IN PAST, SIGNIFICANCE THEIR CONTINUED POSITION RE "WARS OF LIBERATION", AND OUR CONVICTION WHICH I HAD ALREADY STRESSED ONCE THAT US FAILURE TO REACT TO EXTRAORDINARY SOVIET MOVES IN ANGOLA WOULD ONLY HAVE ENCOURAGED REPETITION SUCH DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR ELSEWHERE. I NOTED OUR WILLINGNESS CONSIDER LOOKING AT SOUTH AFRICA WITHDRAWAL FIRST HAD TO BE CONSIDERED IN CONTEXT PROVISIONS FOR SOVIET AND CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ALSO. I STILL THOUGHT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A, B, C, D ON THIS AS I HAD EMPHASIZED IN OUR JANUARY 8 CONVERSATION (DAR ES SALAAM 0087 AND 0089).

6. NYERERE WENT INTO CAREFUL HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION OF HOW TANZANIA HAD COME TO SUPPORT MPLA, SAYING HE HAD ABANDONED HOPE FOR ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY ONLY IN LATE 74/EARLY 75 WHEN MOBUTU MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT ZAIRE NO LONGER INTERESTED IN SUCH GOVERNMENT AND THOUGHT IT COULD DICTATE WHOLE FUTURE OF ANGOLA BY ITS SUPPORT FOR FNLA. PURPOSE OF THIS, HE INDICATED, WAS TO SHOW THAT FORMULAS DON'T WORK IN ANGOLA SITUATION. HE DIDN'T THINK PHASED SOUTH AFRICAN/

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RUSSIAN/CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FORMULA COULD BE CONSTRUCTED EITHER. HE WAS PRETTY SURE HOW HISTORY WOULD UNFOLD IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS WERE OUT; IF US STOPPED SUPPLYING MILITARY SUPPORT; IF US WERE PREPARED ACCEPT POLITICAL STRUCTURE ANGOLA IN WHICH MPLA HAD MAJOR ROLE; AND IF US WOULD NOT BE INSPIRED TO FURTHER COUNTERACTION BY FACT THAT MPLA WOULD CONTINUE TAKE "NORMAL" AID FROM ITS COMMUNIST SUPPORTERS, RUSSIANS AND CUBANS WOULD IN FACT SOON BE OUT.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0221

NODIS

SUGGEST DEPT REPEAT KHARTOUM, ACCRA, MOGADISCION LAGOS,
ADDIS ABABA

7. DESPITE REPEATED EFFORTS, I WAS UNABLE SHAKE HIM FROM THIS APPROACH AS BEING ONLY PRACTICABLE ONE. FURTHEST HE WOULD GO WAS TO SAY THAT IF ABOVE SEQUENCE STARTED TO RUN, HE WOULD WORK AS HARD AS HE COULD FOR RECONCILIATION, TELLING NETO, "SOUTH AFRICANS ARE OUT; AMERICANS AND WEST ARE DE-ESCALATING; THERE IS NO LONGER NEED FOR RUSSIAN AND CUBAN TROOPS; GET RID OF THEM". ON TIMING, IF ANGOLA WERE NYERERE'S COUNTRY, HE WOULD SAY TO RUSSIANS AND CUBANS AFTER TWO-THREE MONTHS, "LEAVE ME A FEW OF YOUR PEOPLE FOR TRAINING BUT TAKE YOUR TROOPS OUT NOW." HE WOULD TELL NETO THAT WAS WHAT HE SHOULD DO. SO WOULD ALL OTHER AFRICANS. CUBANS WOULD BE HAPPY CLAIM THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL GLORY AND LEAVE. UNLESS RUSSIANS WERE MAD THEY WOULD DO SAME.

8. I SAID I HAD TOLD HIM AT BEGINNING OUR SERIES OF CONVERSATIONS THAT US WAS FLEXIBLE AND RECEPTIVE TO REASON AND LOGIC. I THOUGHT I HAD JUST DEMONSTRATED THAT AGAIN. WERE WE TO BE ONLY ONES WHO MUST DEMONSTRATE THESE VIRTUES? DID HE REALLY SEE NO NEW MOVES NOW OPENING FOR AFRICAN STATES? HE REPEATED THAT HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY US POSITION; HE HOPED WE WOULD CONTINUE MOVE IN OUR CURRENT DIRECTION. THE MORE THE US DOES SO, THE MORE AFRICANS WILL FEEL FREE TO WORK ON THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE SITUATION. THIS WAS NOT THE TIME FOR HIM TO ACT, BUT HE WISHED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE AND PERHAPS A TIME WOULD COME WHEN HE COULD BE HELPFUL IN A MORE SPECIFIC WAY.

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9. COMMENT: NYERERE DEMONSTRATED AGAIN THAT HE CAN BE TOUGH AS WELL AS CHARMING. BELIEVE REPEATED EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET/CUBAN WITHDRAWAL IS GETTING THROUGH TO HIM TO SOME DEGREE BUT THAT HE HAS NOT YET REACHED POINT WHERE HE IS PREPARED ACT IN ANY AGREED WAY ON IT. SUSPECT, INDEED, IT WILL NEVER BE POSSIBLE TO INSPIRE HIM TO PLAY ROLE IN ANY SPECIFIED FORMULA. HOWEVER, HE CLEARLY PLEASED TO BE INVOLVED IN DIALOGUE, MAY BEGIN TO REFLECT SOME OF IT IN CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER AFRICANS, AND CONCEIVABLY COULD PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE (IF CONSCIENTIOUSLY UNSTRUCTURED) ROLE FURTHER DOWN THE ROAD.

10. INCIDENTIALLY, HE ASKED TO WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES WE WERE COMMUNICATING OUR PRESENT VIEWS. I SAID I NOT SURE BUT THOUGHT WE MIGHT BE TALKING ALONG SAME LINES TO SUDAN, CHANA, SOMALIA, ETHIOPIA, AND PERHAPS NIGERIA. HE NODDED APPROVINGLY AND ADDED HE INTENDED TO ANSWER PRESIDENT'S LETTER SOON BUT WASN'T QUITE SURE WHICH OF MANY POINTS WE HAD COVERED HE SHOULD FOCUS ON. I SAID I SURE PRESIDENT WOULD VALUE ALL HIS THOUGHTS AND ADDED I PERSONALLY WAS DISTRESSED TO NOTE QUOTES ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN INDIA BY PRESS ON PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER. HE SAID HE KNEW THAT (REF B) BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

11. IF WE ARE GOING TO MOVE AHEAD WITH DIALOGUE NOTED REF A, BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF AFRICAN POSTS INVOLVED EACH COULD HAVE BENEFIT EXCHANGES IN RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. HENCE, SLUG AT HEAD OF THIS CABLE.
SPAIN

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